EU external policy-making and the case of Morocco: 'Realistically' dealing with authoritarianism? by Cavatorta, Francesco et al.
 1
EU External policy-making: 
'Realistically' Dealing with Authoritarianism? 
The case of Morocco. 
 
Francesco Cavatorta, Raj S. Chari, Sylvia Kritzinger and Arantza Gomez Arana 
 
Introduction 
The European Union’s (EU’s) limited foreign policy activity has been linked to 
the ‘soft’ issues of international politics, such as negotiating international trade 
agreements, promoting international human rights and supporting democratization. In 
the early 1980s, for example, the Community exercized an indirect positive influence 
on regime transformation in Southern Europe by acting as a ‘magnet for democracy’.1  
However, the role of the EU has recently changed and it has become a more pro-
active entity with a more coherent and extensive range of foreign policy objectives 
and tools, including a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Over the last 
decade, it has therefore become a vocal actor in international affairs as a result of the 
transformations of the global security environment. This new role is based on a 
conceptualization of security which assumes that international stability and security 
can only be achieved through the promotion of norms which have shaped the EU 
itself: legally binding treaties, multilateral institutions, democratic governance and 
economic interpenetration. EU policies subsequently embrace these fundamental 
normative principles.    
Since the mid-90s, an important target area in terms of foreign and security policy 
is the Mediterranean basin whose policy pillar has been the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership (EMP). Three aspects guide this initiative: the first is a political and 
security partnership which emphazises the rule of law, respect for human rights and 
pluralism; the second is an economic and financial partnership,2 which seeks 
‘sustainable and balanced economic and social development with a view to achieving 
the objective of creating an area of shared prosperity’;3 and the third is social, cultural 
and human affairs partnerships, which rejects the notion of the clash of civilizations 
in favour of a dialogue between cultures. The very core of this initiative sees the 
promotion of western liberal democratic values, including accountable electoral 
procedures, respect for human rights, and a free market economy. Together, this 
                                                 
 Francesco Cavatorta is Lecturer at the School of Law and Government at Dublin City 
University (francesco.cavatorta@dcu.ie). Raj S. Chari is Lecturer at the Department of 
Political Science in Trinity College Dublin (charir@tcd.ie). Sylvia Kritzinger is Professor at 
the Department of Methods in the Social Sciences at the University of Vienna 
(sylvia.kritzinger@univie.ac.at). Arantza Gomez Arana is a PhD-student at the Department of 
Politics at the University of Glasgow (maranzazugomez@hotmail.com) 
1 See L. Whitehead, ‘Democracy by Convergence: Southern Europe’ in L. Whitehead (ed.) 
The International Dimensions of Democratization (Oxford University Press, New York, 
1996). 
2 For a current evaluation of it see J. Brach, ‘The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: The Role 
and Impact of the Economic and Financial Dimension’ (2007) 10/4 European Foreign Affairs 
Review, pp. 555-579. But see also D. Geradin and N. Petit, ‘Competition Policy and the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership’ (2003) 8/2 European Foreign Affairs Review, pp. 153-180. 
3 Barcelona Declaration, 1995. 
 2
should lead to stability, which is profitable to the EU and the countries on the 
southern Mediterranean bank. In this context, ‘security’ is inevitably linked with 
‘democracy’.   
In light of international events, it is now apparent that ‘security in the 
Mediterranean has attained a higher profile’.4 However, ten years after its launch, 
several academics and policy-makers lament the results achieved through the 
Barcelona process, which has not been successful in achieving its core objectives.5 
Some have even recently claimed that the ‘Barcelona process has been classified as a 
diplomatic rather than substantive success’.6 This is particularly the case for the issues 
of democracy, human rights and rule of law, which have made scant progress in Arab 
partner countries on the Southern Bank of the Mediterranean. Security for the EU was 
the central objective of EMP, but it was to be achieved through norms based policies 
rather than through policy tools in tune with the tenets of Realism. Although issues of 
securitization in the region are explored elsewhere in the context of IR theories,7 the 
purpose of this paper is to employ and apply a realist perspective to a specific case 
study.       
Reasons offered for the absence of significant successes in EMP include: the 
divisions between Member States that impede clear policy formulation; the weakness 
of the institutional set-up; and the ability of target countries to devise survival 
strategies intended to preserve the current elites in power. All these explanations 
assume that the EU is genuinely interested in promoting democratic governance and 
its actions in the region fail because of realpolitik factors that ‘get in the way’. In this 
respect, many display an attitude of faith towards the conflation of democracy and 
security that the EU declares to uphold. Recently, Grugel argued that ‘the EU’s 
commitment to supporting and extending liberal democracy is well established’,8 but 
this research is based on the assumption that the previous claim is not without 
controversy.    
This research proposes, instead, to forward an alternative framework through 
which the EU’s activities in the region can be studied.9 The research considers the EU 
not as the wholly normative actor that many claim it to be. Rather, it considers the EU 
as an international actor that makes rationalist assumptions about both its material 
interests and its normative ones. As such, we introduce a degree of Realism to the 
theoretical understanding of the EU. While this might not be a novelty in EU studies 
                                                 
4 See S. Biscop, Euro-Mediterranean Security: A Search for Partnership (Ashgate, Aldershot, 
2003). 
5 See R. Youngs, ‘European Approaches to Security in the Mediterranean’ (2003) 57/3 
Middle East Journal, pp. 414-431. 
6 See A. Echague and R. Youngs, ‘Democracy and Human Rights in the Barcelona Process: 
Conclusions of a Workshop at FRIDE, Madrid, 14-16 January, 2005’ (2005) 10/2 
Mediterranean Politics, pp. 233-237 at p. 234.  
7 See H. Malmvig, ‘Security through Intercultural Dialogue?’ (2005) 10/3 Mediterranean 
Politics, pp. 349-364. 
8 See J. Grugel, ‘Democratization and Ideational Diffusion: Europe, Mercosur and Social 
Citizenship’ (2007) 45/1 Journal of Common Market Studies, pp. 43-68 at p. 44. 
9 See also B. Hettne and F. Söderbaum, ‘Civilian Power or Soft Imperialism? The EU as a 
Global Actor and the Role of Interregionalism’ (2005) 10/4 European Foreign Affairs 
Review, pp. 535-552. 
 3
regarding EU’s military operations abroad,10 we test the validity of such an outlook by 
considering the empirical evidence emerging from EU-Moroccan case and its 
consequences for the pro-democracy stances of the Union. In the context of such a 
theoretical perspective, the Barcelona process might not be a failure, but may be the 
means through which the EU and its Member States have maintained stability in the 
region while increasing material benefits. Due to the extensive and contradictory 
objectives of the Barcelona process, one may hypothezise that the assessment of the 
policy depends on the theoretical approach adopted for understanding the EU. If one 
espouses the predominant normative view that the EU has of itself, it is true that the 
EMP did not achieve development, democratization and therefore security. However, 
adopting a different theoretical perspective leads to a different assessment. While 
there is no reason why norms such democracy, human rights and rule of law cannot be 
the basis for stability and security, the specific measures put in place through EMP 
seem to undermine such norms. This might be intentional because the outcome of the 
export of norms might be detrimental to EU material and strategic interests in the 
region. A different interpretation of security, with realist undertones, therefore 
emerges. On their part, partner countries exploit such contradictions and privilege 
political stability, read regime survival, over all norms.11     
This paper first builds on Youngs’s work.12 He postulates that the EU might be 
conceived of as a rationalist actor pursuing both normative and interest-based 
outcomes not only because Member States have an important role in the EU’s 
institutional structure, but also because the formally independent institutions must 
operate in a ‘realist’ international environment, where exclusively normative actors 
overlook the constraints derived from participating in a system where other actors do 
not operate normatively. The second part considers how the EU operates in one 
particular target country: the Kingdom of Morocco. Morocco is a solid case because 
of its close relationship with, and high dependence on, the EU. The perceived lack of 
success of the Barcelona process in this moderately authoritarian country is thus 
striking because it is precisely in these ‘liberalised autocracies’13 where one would 
expect to see considerable changes after 10 years of EU engagement.  
 
EMP: the Normative Power of the EU?  
After the Cold War, the EU’s common external policy responded to new and 
expanded security challenges. Amidst political and strategic uncertainties that the 
international system presented, ‘one of the most prominent themes of Europe’s 
transformed security situation during this period was the value attached to democracy 
promotion and human rights’.14 This promotion of democracy and rule of law through 
economic development was perceived as more genuine than that undertook by other 
countries. For instance, although the USA accorded a high priority to human rights 
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and democracy-promotion since Carter and Reagan,15 the basis upon which they were 
built was controversial.16 The main problem the USA faced was the contradiction that 
emerged between pursuing a normative policy of democracy-promotion with a realist 
foreign policy characterized by a narrow concept of security and short-term interests, 
which almost always won. This was particularly evident in the Middle East, where a 
range of authoritarian regimes still continues to receive strong backing from 
Washington because they guarantee regional stability, access to resources and peace 
to Israel.17 What is true for the USA is also true for other, unilaterally acting, 
European countries. Their democracy-promotion strategies often compete with the 
requirement of pursuing material interests and are therefore undermined and emptied 
of their significance.18  
It is not perceived that the EU suffers from difficulties of reconciling normative 
and material interests because, as an international actor, it is considered to be (and 
perceives itself as being) wholly normative. From this vantage, the EU has a unique 
institutional structure, an approach to international affairs rooted in multilateralism 
and an alternative approach to politics wherein it moved away from ‘power politics’ 
and drew upon international law, norms, rules, and cooperation. Subsequently, this 
new ‘normative power’ now defines the EU.19 As such, the EU ‘forces’ change on 
other actors through ideational impact, with the belief that ‘good’ behaviour affects 
other actors in the system through osmosis. Lightfoot and Burchell20 suggest that it is 
precisely because the EU has been constructed on a normative basis that it operates as 
a normative power. However, in order to extend these constitutive norms to the 
international system, the EU has to be perceived as acting above reproach. Regarding 
security within this normative structure, the concept reflects a security that is the 
product of ideas and is thus equated with the expansion of democracy, rule of law and 
economic development.  
Contrary to the USA’s perceived actions in the Middle East and North Africa, the 
EU is said to operate solely considering notions of economic development and 
democratization through civil society promotion, rather than self-interested alliances 
with unsavoury authoritarian regimes. This means that policy instruments through 
which the EU engages attempt to bring target regimes, over time, in line with the 
EU’s values. Because of its history of expansion through democracy and rule of law, 
it was inevitable that the EU would export its own model of integration to achieve, 
through economic development, democratic change in other global regions. The 
outcome of this strategy is the self-interested achievement of perpetual ‘Kantian’ 
security. Thus, when the EU ‘does’ security, it relies on a ‘cooperative approach’ with 
the target countries it operates in, looking for change through osmosis.    
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The Mediterranean basin, in political, social and economic turmoil since the mid-
80s, represented a priority area for implementing the security policies of the EU. 
Through the Barcelona process, the EU attempted to export its own model in the mid-
90s without imposing it. Hollis stated that ‘the focus is on dialogue and the EU 
undertakes to assist with indigenously-generated reform.21 According to Biscop the 
EMP sought ‘to do away with the idea of the Mediterranean as a frontier and to make 
it once again a crossroads of ideas’.22 
Yet, over ten years after its launch the results of EMP have been deemed 
unsatisfactory in terms of exporting norms in order to achieve greater security. As 
such, several authors deem the whole process a failure. Yet, why has this occurred? A 
number of distinct explanations have been suggested. For example, the first focuses 
on the survival strategies of the partner countries, which were able to defuse 
democratic pressures while hijacking the benefits of economic reforms. According to 
Hollis, some Europeans contend that ‘Arab elites have proved adaptive at maintaining 
their relatively privileged positions […] and governments have resisted European 
efforts to support civil society, democracy and human rights.23 Another explanation 
concentrates on the weakness of EU strategies due to the strength of Member States in 
foreign policy formulation. Thus, what undermines EMP is the same type of diverging 
Member States’ interests pursued during the 2003 Iraq war.24 A third explanation 
concentrates on the failure of the Middle East Peace process, whose repercussions 
impede lasting security arrangements and domestic change in Arab countries.25 
Finally, there are constitutional explanations for the ineffectiveness of the EU area 
whereby the structure of the decision-making process is too complex and the 
institutional participants too diverse.26 If we add that Member States’ interests have to 
be incorporated, the result is a rather incoherent strategy that has not been 
successfully implemented.27  
While the dissatisfaction that exists with EMP among scholars and external 
observers is due to the fact that they correctly point to major inconsistencies within 
the policy, such dissatisfaction does not theoretically question the EU as a normative 
power as blame rests primarily with the Member States or the partner countries 
operating as wholly self-interested actors. Irrespective of their significant differences, 
all these explanations share a common premise: they assume that the EU per se has a 
genuine interest in promoting economic development and democracy in order to 
achieve security and stability at its borders by virtue of its ideational power. Any 
failure rests with individual states.  
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However, if we interpret EMP as not being exclusively normative, what seems to 
be a failed policy in need of revisions may full well represent a successful policy to 
achieve regional ‘realist’ stability in a volatile region. Volpi recently highlighted this 
and stated that within a realist framework, ‘the assessment of the EU would be that 
stable regimes running their national economy efficiently in the Middle East and 
North Africa provide the best means of obtaining a well-policed zone of regional 
security and prosperity’.28 
Drawing on the realist tradition, it is therefore useful to look at the EU’s external 
activities through different lenses beyond normative ones. As Donnelly states, 
‘political realism is a tradition of analysis that stresses the imperatives states face to 
pursue a power politics of the national interest’.29 With its emphasis on the role of the 
state in selfishly pursuing its national interest and gain through ‘amoral’ power 
politics, realism prima facie seems to be far removed from how the EU perceives 
itself. Further, it may initially seem difficult to reconcile the primacy of statism in 
realist thinking with the EU, which is, after all not a state, but a political system. 
However, through the adoption of Waltzian structural realism,30 an analysis of the EU 
based on realist categories is possible. It is noteworthy, for example, that in his theory 
of international politics Waltz referred to ‘units’ operating in an anarchic system and 
therefore subject to constraints of survival as a function of their capabilities. If 
interpreted through these categories, the EU becomes one of the many units in an 
anarchic system with a certain degree of power (which does not have to necessarily be 
only military) that attempt to maximize interests and defend privileged positions. 
Some EU policy scholars argue that ‘existing EU institutions shape and constrain 
intergovernmental policy-making’,31 while others emphazise that ‘the EU should be 
understood as a system of multi-level governance’.32 This latter approach sees the 
Commission occupying a significant position in multi-level governance, because it 
has the knowledge and expertise to influence Member States with respect to EMP. EU 
institutions can play the role of a unit at international level.  
Additionally, one can hypothezise that the EU bureaucracy dealing with questions 
of foreign and security policy may be influenced by international relations’ concepts 
that are not normative at all. In this respect, the EU, while having normative 
characteristics, could also display significant rationalist/realist features. Youngs 
argues that ‘greater emphasis and precision are needed to understand the factors that 
suggest strategic calculation within the broader parameters of value-informed 
policies’.33 Youngs suggested that three criteria be used to evaluate the degree of 
realism behind EU external policies: strategies employed, degree of instrumental 
reasoning behind the use of norms and the nature of the policy-making process. 
Utilising these criteria he evaluates human rights policies implemented by the 
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(2001) 39/2 Journal of Common Market Studies, pp. 221-244 at p. 226. 
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(2001) 39/2 Journal of Common Market Studies, pp. 221-244 at p. 227 
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(2004) 42/2 Journal of Common Market Studies, pp. 415-435 at p. 421. 
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Commission and demonstrates that the EU is not only about norms, but also about 
material interests that are justified through norms. Thus, Hyde-Price emphazised the 
importance of ‘the systemic determinants of EU foreign and security policy’.34 By 
simply being part of the international system wherein the principle of anarchy is still 
dominant, the EU narrowly conceives what is desirable in terms of changes it wants to 
promote. Discussing US democracy promotion strategies Gause recognizes that 
further democratization in the Middle East would ‘most likely generate Islamist 
governments less inclined to cooperate with the United States on important policy 
goals’.35 The same strategic imperative also applies to the EU because some material 
interests need to be defended and promoted in order to improve on its position: 
Islamist governments would challenge that. It follows that the emphasis on the causal 
mechanism ‘development/democracy/security’ simply represents intentional rhetoric 
designed to convey a different message from the one conveyed by other actors. It is 
not a policy framework the EU may truly act upon. Vasconcelos argues that at the 
launch of EMP ‘it was implicitly understood that the key security problem was 
political Islam’36 and this is what is at the core of EU thinking still, as the political 
developments in Palestine demonstrate.   
With this realist framework in mind, it is possible to hypothezise that, irrespective 
of their degree of authoritarianism, regime stability in the target countries is the real 
priority because these regimes can guarantee no upset in the international status quo, 
which would threaten EU interests in the area. For example, economic aid from 
Europe, rather than benefiting political opponents of authoritarian regimes, would be 
channelled to governments. The result is that international legitimacy would be given 
to such regimes, not political opponents. It follows from this that the strategies 
implemented through the Euro-Mediterranean partnership may be achieving their 
desired results if one postulates that the EU is an international actor desiring regional 
stability within a realist concept of security, which maximizes benefits in place of 
norms. In this context, the EU perceives the promotion of real economic and 
democratic changes as representing a short-term destabilization of the area and 
therefore a threat.  
Political and security issues were the EU’s priority in the EMP and it is still 
unprepared to deal with the consequences of following up on its normative 
declarations. Accordingly, the adversarial nature of the main opposition groups in the 
Arab members of the Partnership represents a stumbling block in the relationship, 
undermining the EU’s pro-democracy initiatives. The low priority for democratic 
change is reflected in the type of policy instruments that are utilized, privileging 
dialogue with the partner regimes, which have a low degree of domestic legitimacy, 
rather than engagement with movements that truly represent the view of large sectors 
of society, irrespective of how unappealing these views might be. While the EU can 
claim being a norm-exporting actor while simultaneously obtaining material benefits 
and strengthening its security, the strains remain obvious.  
Thus, once one marginalizes the normative aspect, the impact on security of the 
policies pursued through EMP emerges. The following section analyses EU policies 
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in Morocco in this context. If the assumption that the EU is partially interest-driven 
were correct, one would find evidence that what the EU does in partner countries 
strengthens, not weakens, the regime. Democracy-promotion is conventionally based 
on support for the opposition in its demands for reforms and on denying legitimacy of 
the current authoritarian ruler. This does not entail a radical confrontational approach, 
but does entail that a certain ‘distance’ be maintained vis-à-vis the ruling elite. If 
however the hypothesis were correct, the EU would consider the current ruler of 
Morocco as a true partner in the process of democratization while aid given is passed 
through official channels. In other words, one would find evidence of the following: 
a) EU policy-makers have a clear understanding of what constitutes a security threat, 
i.e. political Islam; b) accordingly, the privileged interlocutors become the 
authoritarian government, while ‘secular’ opposition parties remain sidelined; c) in 
order to strengthen the incumbents, EU funding and aid is given mostly through 
‘official’ governmental channels and; d) hard security concerns take precedence over 
other forms of interaction.  
If such evidence is found one could argue that the EU, far from being the victim 
of Member States, is independently pursuing a policy that is framed through 
traditional conceptualizations of security, relying on authoritarian states to achieve its 
goals. This helps also explain the misplaced focus on economic liberalization as a 
foundation for democratic reforms, in the knowledge that such a causal mechanism is 
at best tenuous, if not counterproductive.37 Therefore, EU policies externally re-
enforce authoritarian domestic dynamics by choosing not to challenge the regime or 
support the opposition. Simultaneously, the EU obtains its most preferred outcome 
while claiming it promotes democracy. Unsurprisingly, ‘for Arab civil society, this 
has often been perceived as a cynical pact between Europe and the Arab regimes to 
consolidate the political status quo’.38  
To conclude, while a realist interpretation of EMP is restricted and does not 
capture the full complexities of the policy,39 a rationalist perspective of what the EU 
does through the Barcelona process avoids the trap of reconciling the dichotomy 
between stated objectives and policies implemented to achieve them. In addition it 
would explain the puzzle as to ‘why democratic norms are successfully introduced, 
whilst in other cases only a superficial or mimetic process of change takes place’.40  
Such rationalism is particularly evident in changed perceptions in global security 
after 9/11, but also in the launch of the European Security Strategy (ESS) 2003 and 
the wider European Neighbourhood policy. The manner in which the ESS identifies 
and proposes to deal with the key security threats makes Arab partners in EMP the 
legitimate interlocutors, therefore defeating the stated assumption that the only viable 
type of security can be achieved through democratizing the periphery of Europe. 
Specific references to ‘bad governance’ are not made to any of the partners, but, 
rather, to countries such as Somalia and Liberia. Similarly, the European 
Neighbourhood Policy is unmistakably framed in terms of interests. There is for 
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View’ (2003) 8/2 European Foreign affairs Review, pp. 181-199. 
40 See Flockart in J. Grugel, ‘Democratization and Ideational Diffusion: Europe, Mercosur 
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instance close cooperation with neighbours to enable the EU to provide security and 
welfare to its citizens as well as the effective control of border.41   
 
The EU and Morocco: security through stable authoritarianism 
Ten years of engagement with the Arab partners have not altered the dilemma 
between the risks of democratization and the relative safety of regime stability in the 
area, central to understanding the Partnership. At its heart, there always was ‘political 
Islam’. Even before EMP was launched, it was argued that ‘threats to European 
security (would) arise not from malevolent state power but rather from a complete or 
partial breakdown of state authority on the other side of the Mediterranean’.42 Paying 
heed to this, European institutions saw the advances made by Islamist movements as 
destabilizing and dangerous for the Mediterranean basin, claiming that opposition 
groups in power would have resulted in nuclear weapons, a safe haven for terrorists, 
and mass migration. These fears were augmented by a new brand of transnational 
terrorism and political violence produced by radical Islamist groups from the 
Maghreb, a threat to Arab partners’ domestic stability. It did not much matter that 
mainstream Islamist parties vigorously condemned the use of violence.  
The inevitable consequence for any European initiative to obtain security 
ultimately rested in an unsavoury alliance with autocratic and ‘illegitimate’ rulers in 
partner countries, meaning that security through democracy could not be achieved. 
Given that ‘the possibility of a direct attack on the Union as a whole or on anyone of 
its Member States [could] be practically ruled out’,43 other security objectives, such as 
avoiding domestic instability on the southern bank, controlling mass migration, 
ensuring non-proliferation and conducting a ‘war on terrorism,’ could be achieved 
only through cooperating with authoritarian regimes. This overarching policy 
framework negatively impacted on the strategy of achieving security through goals of 
economic development and democracy. If the EU were truly attempting to promote a 
concept of security based on these goals, one would see a form of economic 
cooperation unbeneficial to the current governing elites, the use of conditionality 
when a partner country ‘misbehaves’, a positive engagement with opposition parties 
and a freeze on cooperative military and police agreements. However, the opposite is 
the case. The active policies regarding the promotion of economic and political 
reforms have, since the beginning of the Partnership, taken place within a well 
defined security framework: real democratic legitimacy, which should theoretically 
guide peaceful relations among states according to the EU’s values, would not be 
bestowed upon Islamist movements of any sort. As Holden stated, ‘the latent and 
actual political crises, economic stagnation and rapid population growth rendered it 
necessary for the EU to take a leadership role in the region if it wanted to avoid 
instability (and migration) spreading northwards’.44 Thus, very real security concerns 
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44 See P. Holden, ‘Partnership Lost? The EU’s Mediterranean Aid Programmes’ (2005) 10/1 
Mediterranean Politics, pp. 19-37 at p. 22. 
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guided the policy since its inception, leading to a hierarchy of objectives.45 Thus, the 
EMP can be better understood as achieving the narrow security objective of regime 
stability by supporting authoritarianism. Achieving stability is imperative because it 
fosters the continuation of the international status quo, which is obtained through 
mandates that strengthen the incumbents in the Arab partner countries who are the 
privileged interlocutors with whom trade negotiation (which benefits European 
business) takes place. Such incumbents subsequently capitalize on their gate-keeping 
position to extract resources from the EU, which allow for preservation of power.46 
Security for the EU means that ‘no country adjoining the EU territory [can be] 
regarded as a military threat today’.47 As such, the EU has focused on what can be 
considered soft security issues such as terrorism, migration, illegal trafficking or 
organized crime. The necessity to deal with these issues, which are bundled with the 
larger problem of political Islam, makes the Partnership security oriented. If one 
considers that the EU has hegemonic tendencies48 in its pursuit of material economic 
benefits, the Partnership seems to be a realist enterprise rather than a genuine creation 
of an area of peace, security and stability. Normative assumptions would highlight the 
employment of instruments to promote economic development and democratization, 
while realism would see the EU as largely promoting its own economic interests and 
abandoning moral stances about democratic rule.  
Morocco highlights all the apparent shortcomings of the partnership, but also 
indicates how successful the EMP has been in achieving short-term security through 
authoritarianism. In order to understand the relationship between Morocco and the EU 
one must start with an analysis of the nature of Morocco, which, after ten years of 
engagement with the EU, remains authoritarian, poor and more ‘Islamicised’ than 
ever before.49 In terms of democratic governance, holding elections does not per se 
guarantee that effective and popularly sanctioned policy-making has ensued, 
particularly in the presence of severe restrictions on the only Islamist movement (the 
PJD) that takes part to these elections.50 The Moroccan constitutionalist Bendorou 
recently confirmed that ‘all power is really in the hands of the King’51 and while 
certain liberalising measures have been implemented, the levers of power are still 
exclusively in the hands of the King and his unelected advisors.52 Moreover, elections 
exclude one of the leading opposition movements (the Justice and Spirituality Group 
led by Sheikh Abdessalam Yassine), while the legal Islamist formation exercises self-
restraint and self-censorship on several issues. Turning to human rights, Morocco has 
much left to be desired: Amnesty International stated in 2004 ‘the sharp rise in 
reported cases of torture or ill-treatment in the context of counter-terrorism’. NGOs 
                                                 
45 See D. Schmid, ‘The Use of Conditionality in Support of Political, Economic and Social 
Rights: unveiling the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’s True Hierarchy of Objectives?’ 
(2004) 9/3 Mediterranean Politics, pp. 396-421. 
46 See B. Ghalioun, ‘The persistence of Arab authoritarianism’ (2004) 15/4 Journal of 
Democracy, pp. 191-192. 
47 See R. Aliboni, ‘The Geopolitical Implications of the European Neighbourhood Policy’ 
(2005) 10/1 European Foreign Affairs Review, pp. 1-16 at p. 1. 
48 See F. Attinà, ‘The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Assessed: The Realist and Liberal 
View’ (2003) 8/2 European Foreign affairs Review, pp. 181-199. 
49 See N. Beau and C. Graciet, Quand le Maroc Sera Islamiste (La Découverte, Paris, 2006). 
50 See M. Willis, ‘Morocco’s Islamists and the Legislative Elections of 2002: The Strange 
Case of the Party That Did Not want to Win’ (2004) 9/1 Mediterranean Politics, pp. 53-81. 
51 See Le Journal Hebdomadaire 2005, p. 28. 
52 See J.P. Tuquoi, Majesté, je dois beaucoup à votre père (Albin Michel, Paris, 2006). 
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aside, even one of Morocco’s closest allies, the USA, criticized Morocco’s human 
rights record.53 Somewhat ironically, the EU has highlighted ‘positive developments’, 
emphazising new legislation aimed at improving individual liberties. In 2001, the EU 
believed that ‘significant progress in terms of individual freedoms and fundamental 
rights’ was made. While this might have been true following the changes introduced 
by the late King Hassan II in the late 1990s,54 successive reports failed to fully 
account for the human rights’ deterioration since 9/11 and after the Casablanca 
bombings of 2003. The evidence suggests that Morocco does not satisfy the criteria of 
good governance and respect for fundamental human rights and many proponents of a 
normative Europe question why the EU remains silent on the issues such as thousands 
of Moroccan Islamists being imprisoned, tortured and sent to jail after being 
convicted in kangaroo-courts reminiscent of those held in the 1970s by Hassan II. 
Given that the EU is the stronger actor in the relationship, it would be expected that 
its normative values were more forcefully pursued. However, the EU seems to care 
little about the absence of democracy and human rights abuses: the EU marginalizes 
these issues in favour of other policy areas that satisfy the EU’s realpolitik concerns.55 
This policy of security through authoritarianism rests on strengthening the 
Moroccan regime through two interconnected policy pillars: economic aid/reforms 
and military/police arrangements, a discussion to which we now turn. 
 
Economic reforms: strengthening the regime’s grip   
Despite intentions for the three aspects of the Barcelona process to be integrated, 
each independently developed,56 with the economic aspect being privileged. The 
rationale behind integrating southern Mediterranean economies was that EU trade 
would reduce poverty, thereby mitigating the Islamist message’s appeal. 
Simultaneously, the EU would help introducing liberal reforms, particularly regarding 
the protection and enhancement of human rights. In turn, these reforms would 
undermine the Islamist discourse surrounding the lack of democracy and legitimacy 
of incumbents. However, such thinking was fundamentally flawed because the EU, 
not seeking fundamental regime change, relied on only one interlocutor: the 
incumbent regime. Thus, liberalization was pursued with some coherence because it 
strengthened the current ruling elites around the King, enabling the thwarting of 
domestic challenges. To the detriment of the other normative goals, ‘[…] daily 
management of the Partnership is […] focused on the advancement of the Euro-
Mediterranean Free trade Area (EMFTA) project, which continues to proceed at quite 
a steady pace’.57 Ample evidence demonstrates how economic liberalization has been 
successfully hijacked by the ruling elites.58 Far from triggering democratic openness, 
                                                 
53 See Le Journal Hebdomadaire, 2005, p. 8. 
54 See M. Willis, ‘After Hassan: A New Monarch in Morocco’ (1999) 4/2 Mediterranean 
Politics, pp. 115-128. 
55 See S. Amin and A. El Kenz, Europe and the Arab World (Zed Books, London, 2005). 
56 See E. Philippart, ‘The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: a Critical evaluation of an 
Ambitious Scheme’ (2003) 8/2 European Foreign Affairs Review, pp. 201-220. 
57 See D. Schmid, ‘The Use of Conditionality in Support of Political, Economic and Social 
Rights: unveiling the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’s True Hierarchy of Objectives?’ 
(2004) 9/3 Mediterranean Politics, pp. 396-421 at p. 396. 
58 See B. Dillman, ‘Facing the Market in North Africa’ (2001) 55/2 Middle East Journal, pp. 
198-215. 
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it has led to the creation of semi-democracies59 where opposition Islamists have 
exposed growing inequalities that the European driven economic order has 
generated.60 This has subsequently had a profound impact on the political system, 
where incumbents and European officials cannot tolerate such views because it would 
require unsatisfactory change from their vantage.  
This is demonstrated by the aids given by the EU to the Moroccan government, 
turning a blind eye to EMP clauses on universal human rights and democratic 
governance. For example, through authoritarian government authorities, between 
2000-2001  
 
‘… the following programmes were approved: financial sector 
adjustment (52 million EUR); health sector reform (50 million 
EUR); justice reform (28 million EUR); rural development in 
Khenifra (9 million EUR); solid waste management in Essaouira (2 
million EUR); water sector adjustment (120 million EUR). Morocco 
has been the leading recipient among the Mediterranean partners in 
terms of total funds received from the MEDA programme. … 
(U)nder the MEDA programme Morocco has so far received a total 
of € 1,180.5 million in commitment appropriations: € 656 million 
under MEDA I (1995 - 1999) and € 524.5 million under MEDA II 
(2000 – 2003). (Additionally, the European Investment Bank loaned 
Morocco) during the period 1995 – 2002, € 1,220 million, intended 
among others for construction and upgrading of highways and rural 
roads, improvements to sewerage and water management systems, 
rehabilitation of the railway network and the development of the 
banking sector’.61  
 
Even the threat of suspension of aid and loans may have had positive effects on 
Morocco’s domestic behaviour. But this never took place. This is particularly 
disconcerting given that the EU itself emphazises the importance of human rights and 
democracy. This evidence suggests that the EU seems to be interested neither in the 
gravity of human rights abuses in Morocco, nor in promoting genuine democratic 
reforms by activating its ‘diplomatic’ and economic arsenal to obtain concessions.  
 
Securitizing the relationship 
Recent international events have only contributed to the further prominence of 
security in the EMP. Despite calls for engaging with the Islamist opposition,62 there is 
considerable reluctance to do so and the securitization of many issues has increased 
with the launch of the ESS and the Neighbourhood Policy. While the lack of 
democracy and the persistence of poverty are central to the security challenges facing 
                                                 
59 See D. Brumberg, ‘The Trap of Liberalised Autocracy’ (2002) 13/4 The Journal of 
Democracy, pp. 56-68. 
60 See A. Yassine, ‘Political manifesto’, www.yassine.net//lettres/memorandum.htm, 22 July 
2003. 
61 The issue of widespread corruption is recognised by EU officials as well in their reports. 
See for instance the Report ‘Euro-Med Partnership: Morocco. Strategy Document 2002-
2006’, December 2001.  
62 See R. Aliboni, ‘Promoting Democracy in the EMP. Which Policy Strategy?’ 2004 
EuroMesco Report. 
 13
the EU,63 such as increased mass-migration and transnational terrorism, the policies 
adopted to counter such threats also fail because the incumbents are the only 
interlocutors. As such, short-term interests are privileged over the long-terms ones of 
democratization. The continued desire to build links with security and police services 
on the Arab side testify to the EU’s unwillingness to stray from its 1995 path. While 
the recent clashes between terrorists and security forces in Morocco should not lead to 
underestimate the threat, the very policies of the EU and the Moroccan regime seem 
to feed militant radicalism, particularly in the very poor slums surrounding Moroccan 
cities.   
If truly a normative actor, one would expect the EU to be reluctant to coordinate 
security policies with discredited Moroccan institutional entities. Yet, in terms of 
territorial disputes and war on terror, Morocco and the EU have cooperated fully, 
which has satisfied mutual priorities. On the territorial front, the EU neither takes an 
interest in the issue of Western Sahara, with Spain even recognizing this region’s 
products as being Moroccan. While ‘relations between Spain and Morocco are 
negatively influenced by the claims of the former on the enclaves of Ceuta and 
Melilla’,64 such minor disagreements are overshadowed by the cooperation since the 
Casablanca and Madrid attacks. Further, the EU has financially supported the 
Kingdom for ‘dealing’ with illegal immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa. Morocco 
ranks highly among the countries receiving military hardware from EU Member 
States. This, despite the existence of an EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports which 
requires governments to export only to states with solid democratic credentials which 
is not the case of Morocco: spending over 4% of its GDP on defence, in 2003 it 
received 13 different categories of armaments under 124 export licenses. EU countries 
profiting from such sales have been France, Germany, and Italy. It is difficult to 
reconcile the objective of economic development and democracy with the sale of 
weapons to states known for their occupation of Western Sahara. On closer 
inspection, such weaponry is instrumental in upgrading the Moroccan armed forces in 
the Western Sahara, and in carrying out soft security ‘duties’ such as preventing 
illegal aliens from reaching Europe.  
Moreover, much rhetoric surrounds the new special relationship on counter-
terrorism. In a recent speech in 2004 Gijs De Vries, the EU Counter-Terrorism 
Coordinator, argued in favour of closer links between Europe and Arab partners on 
the southern Mediterranean bank by way of cooperation with intelligence services. 
This is despite the fact that such security services are notoriously brutal.        
 
The EU: the new realist on the block?  
Why has the EU behaved as it has? One popular explanation for the lack of more 
activism regarding democracy promotion and human rights defence is that it takes 
time for the EU’s ‘normative values’ to influence partner countries. The argument is 
that the EU, as a normative actor, is not forceful in promoting its values because this 
might lead to a ‘backlash’. Thus, the EU prefers to keep the partner ‘engaged’ over a 
long period in order for the ‘osmosis’ of norms to occur. However, this explanation is 
weak for two reasons. First, the EU has been engaged with Morocco for more ten 
years through EMP during which time the human rights situation seems to have 
worsened when compared to the late 1990s. Further, elections in 2002 were less 
                                                 
63 See ESS 2003. 
64 See S. Biscop, Euro-Mediterranean Security: A Search for Partnership (Ashgate, 
Aldershot, 2003) at p. 2.  
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‘democratic’ than in 1997, a year after the Association Agreement had been signed. 
The absence of EU action against Morocco during this time may have implicitly 
signalled that rights and democracy concerns are of minute importance.  
A second explanation considers the weak institutional structure of the Euro-Med 
Partnership, particularly the divisions between Member States. While such 
institutional difficulties may be compelling in other policy areas, it is not convincing 
regarding EU-Morocco relations. This is because the EU has autonomy in external 
trade relations and can leverage this to obtain concessions from Morocco on human 
rights matters. The EU’s inability to do so signals its unwillingness to act.  
A third explanation is that countries such as China and North Korean witness 
more severe human rights abuses and weaker democratic governance than in 
Morocco; therefore, Morocco should be treated differently. This sentiment is seen in 
official EU documents, which expound Morocco’s efforts despite evidence (above) 
pointing to the opposite.65 This ‘relatively nice dictators explanation’ argues that the 
EU refrains from lecturing to Morocco because the King is making some effort to 
bring about change. However, this explanation fails on two grounds. First, the core of 
normative values is that all abuses should be treated and dealt with similarly. 
Philosophically, abuses of human rights are equal and should be dealt with in an equal 
manner. Secondly, the EU operates according to a different logic in similar contexts. 
For example, it lectures to states such as Cuba, the Ukraine and Turkey about human 
rights abuses, but it remains unclear why Morocco is different.  
With the above in mind, traditional power politics realist explanations seem to be 
more convincing in explaining the EU’s attitudes and policies towards Morocco. A 
combination of an ‘economic explanation’ with a ‘geo-strategic’ one provide a cogent 
framework for understanding the EU policy-making vis-à-vis Morocco. The economic 
explanation suggests that the EU has material reasons to marginalize issues of 
democracy and human rights. The main thrust of the EMP is increasing economic ties 
between Europe and countries on the southern bank of the Mediterranean. The 
benefits of this market, with which full liberalization is to occur by 2010, include 
increased energy resources and a significant overall market potential for European 
goods. Unsurprisingly, since the launch of the EMP, the EU has increased trade, 
investment and exports to Morocco, where the trade deficit is in the EU’s favour. 
Because it is a rational actor, which pays more attention to material benefits over 
normative ones, the EU does not upset favourable trade benefits, something 
confirmed by EU officials involved with democracy-promotion strategies.66 While the 
EU may emphazise the role of an independent and active civil society to foster 
democracy and thus co-finances projects aimed at increasing the level of civil society 
activism among youth (such as Euro-Med Youth), the programmes have touched only 
20,000 people (all partner countries included). This indicates a rather low-level 
priority compared to more prominent economic links.  
Coupled with ‘economic interests’ is the ‘realist’ belief that stability is more 
important than democracy when dealing with the Mediterranean. In terms of political 
reforms in Morocco, the EU’s ideal outcome would be a democratization process that 
elects a secular leader who wants to continue a similar political and economic 
relationship to which the current government subscribes. This would entail the 
emergence of a very strong, liberal opposition that is able to marginalize the King 
politically and to outmanoeuvre the popular Islamic movements, whose democratic 
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credentials are unproven. Yet, this outcome is quite unlikely. The largest opposition 
party at the moment is the Islamic Party of Justice and Development. Additionally, 
the most popular civil society movement is an even more radical Islamic formation 
led by Sheikh Yassine,67 who demands democratic accountability in the context of a 
significant transformation of society. Secular opposition movements remain weak and 
considered negatively by vast sectors of society. In such conditions, the EU cannot 
attain the outcome it favours and compromises by dealing with a stable and friendly 
authoritarian regime. Not doing so may result in bitterly fought elections that will 
potentially result in leaders of a new Islamist party coming to power that questions 
and opposes EU policy preferences. The risk of such a party gaining power through 
democratic means is not worth it if stability of the region falls.68 As stability is the 
name of the game, this demonstrates that the EU is acting rationally rather than 
normatively. Otherwise, democracy would be promoted irrespective of the 
consequences for the EU’s interests.  
 
Conclusion 
This study contributed to a better understanding of EU external activities by 
suggesting that this should be examined not only by framing the EU as a wholly 
normative actor, but also by taking into account the rationalist traits that are the 
consequence of operating as a unit in an anarchic international system. The study does 
not suggest that a realist conception of European foreign policy can fully capture the 
entire essence of EU external policy-making. However, the evidence presented can be 
interpreted as informing the validity of at least looking at EU external policies 
through different theoretical lenses. In particular, it seeks to challenge the assumption 
that the EU is always committed to supporting democracy abroad. The findings for 
Morocco, which could be generalized for the entire Middle East, indicate the 
opposite. It is probably true to assert that the EU is very much a normative entity, but 
the values it rests on represent only the outer framework of policies that have a very 
substantial degree of realism and rationalism, where the normative values clash with 
the imperatives of security, interests and short-term gains. The EU interactions with 
Morocco are premised on the assumption that the stability of the authoritarian 
monarchy should not be threatened. This stability is necessary to promote economic 
reforms that are favourable to the European Union and to defend wider strategic 
interests linked to the rise of extremist and potentially anti-Western actors, namely 
Islamists. By building its external relations with Morocco on the unquestioned leading 
role of the monarchy, the European Union is prevented from actively pursuing the 
moral imperatives of democracy and human rights that its normative role requires. 
This occurs because EU policy-makers operate in a ‘realist’ environment which they 
have to take into account.       
Thus, the perceived failures of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership are only 
evident if one takes the theoretical vantage point that envisages the EU and its actions 
as informed only by values. If one accepts, instead, that the EU may have within its 
internal structure contradictions that are derived from the interaction between the 
realist and the ideational, one could offer a slightly more positive judgement of the 
results achieved through the Partnership and a more coherent understanding of the 
policies implemented.  
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In a structural international anarchic system, the continuation of the status quo is 
of fundamental importance to the privileged actors at the top of the power ladder. The 
EU, as a powerful unit in the system, is constrained by such objectives and can be 
seen as operating towards achieving that goal irrespective of its ideational 
constitution. What presently guarantees the continuation of the status quo is the 
survival of the authoritarian regimes targeted through the Partnership. In this respect, 
therefore, security has been achieved and material interests have been promoted. 
Morocco does not represent a threat to the EU as long as the King remains in 
command and as long as Islamists are kept out of power even through un-democratic 
means. At the same time, the Moroccan economy has been opened up to trade with 
increased benefits for European businesses and for a small minority of Moroccan 
economic actors linked to the regime. Critics would correctly point to the facts that 
the threat of terrorism has increased, that illegal migration has continued and that a 
clash of civilizations at the level of ideas is currently under way. However, these 
might not be, in the thinking of realists, unbearable costs to bear when compared to 
what an Islamist take-over might have represented or might represent in the near 
future for Morocco. In the event of the arrival to policy-making power of the Justice 
and Charity Group, problems would likely be much greater as Moroccan Islamists 
would challenge the international political and economic status quo.    
The case of Morocco indicates that stability and security (irrespective how softly 
interpreted) are ‘core norms’ for the EU and the marginalization of other core norms 
such as democracy and human rights is a political sacrifice worth paying if the 
benefits outweigh the costs. This is a traditional realist conceptualization of policy-
making and seems to confirm the validity of the critique of ‘normative’ Europe that 
Hyde-Price recently postulated. The EU is to a certain extent forced to wear 
normative clothes and it periodically issues statements about the necessity for 
Morocco to further democratise and for the authorities to respect human rights, but all 
this quite quickly fades in the background when more pressing interests come to the 
fore. In addition, it should be emphazised that such a realist interpretation is not due 
only to the overbearing influence of Member States within EU policy-making. While 
it is beyond doubt that some Member States utilize external EU policies to promote 
and defend their narrow national interests, it should also be highlighted that the 
Commission and other EU institutions enjoy a wide degree of latitude in making 
certain decisions due to their expertise, presence on the territory and the divisions 
among Member States. While the Commission is far from being the rational and 
unitary actor that realists see as central in the international system, it enjoys a rather 
important role to play as the process of integration deepens and skills and 
competencies are transferred to the supranational level. In short, the EU can be 
conceived as unit in the system. The empirical nature of the paper provides more solid 
arguments for those who are interested in looking at the practical application of the 
theoretical assumptions that scholars of EMP have been debating for some time.  
If and when the EU will truly become a single actor in world politics, one may 
argue that it will likely subscribe to the largely ‘realist’ tendencies that permeate and 
characterize the international system. The case of the EMP and Morocco demonstrates 
that the EU may, in fact, behave as ‘ruthlessly’ as nation states do.          
 
 
 
 
 
